This paper analyses the political economy of trade protection in the context of the factors determining the US Emergency Safeguard Measures for steel imposed March 2002. The paper identifies several factors in addition to the official justification stated problems of global over-capacity and the penetration of imports in the US market, namely the continued failure to restructure poorly performing firms, failure of previous attempts at protection and the influence of the domestic steel lobby and short-term political gains to the Bush Administration of protectionist action. The paper also reviews several ex ante and ex post empirical studies of the impact of the steel Safeguards on the steel industry and downstream steel-consuming activities. All of these studies find that the costs of the Safeguard Measures outweighed their benefits in terms of aggregate GDP and employment as well as having an important redistributive impact. The paper provides a brief summary of the subsequent WTO steel case and the final resolution of the dispute. The evidence suggests that the steel Safeguards owed more to political expediency than justification for protection under the WTO rules.
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In June 2001, the US Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick launched a Section 201 investigation by the US International Trade Commission (USITC) into the difficulties being encountered by the US steel industry. The objective was to establish whether foreign imports were causing injury and therefore whether they merited the imposition of Emergency Safeguard Measures.
The USITC investigation covered imports with a combined value of some $17 billion, more than half of total US imports of steel in 2001.
The preliminary findings found that 85 per cent of the steel imports subjected to scrutiny were causing serious injury (USITC, 2001) . Further, US steel prices were found to be at 20-year lows and around 30 per cent of the industry (by capacity) was in bankruptcy with accumulating losses. The USITC Report found 16 categories of items in four broad steel product groups to be causing serious injury, detailed in Table 1 . These products comprised some 60 per cent of EU exports of steel and steel products to the United States, worth a total of $4 billion. Many of these items were already subject to pre-existing protective measures in the form of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
While unanimous in their findings of serious injury being caused, the members of the USITC differed concerning the appropriate remedy. Tariffs ranging from 20 to 40 per cent as well as quotas were recommended. The USITC Report also proposed that further assistance be provided to steel workers and affected communities through the National Emergency Grants programme, including effective job training and direct assistance with the industry's legacy costs. These legacy costs comprise an estimated $13 billion of contract commitments by struggling steel firms, primarily integrated mills, in the provision of employee health-care and pensions coverage. The result of unionisation and long-standing labour contracts in the integrated mill sector, they have been a major impediment to the restructuring of the sector. The newer mini-mills generally operate with more flexible labour contracts and have opposed US Government funding of legacy costs in the integrated mill sector. The USITC recommended that the legacy cost problem should be dealt with by Congress (Zoellick, 2002a) . cent tariffs and some tariff quotas, effective 20 March for three years. These were introduced as Emergency Safeguard Measures against:
Surges in foreign imports … to ensure that American industries compete on a level playing field [given] the harm from 50 years of foreign government intervention in the global steel market [in terms of 30] bankruptcies, serious dislocations and [20,000] job losses [from the] glut of cheap imports, global overcapacity and … falling prices leading to falling profitability [and] to give the US steel industry time to restructure without harming the US economy (Bush, 2002) .
With only limited exceptions, President Bush imposed protection that was significantly higher than that recommended by the USITC Commissioners (see Table 1 ) to provide the domestic industry with 'breathing space to restructure and become newly competitive' (Zoellick, 2002a) . The margin of protection was to be reduced annually over the three-year span of the measures. (WTO, 1999) . This is followed by a review of the empirical studies of the impact of the Emergency Safeguard Measures on the US economy, all of which find that they resulted in a net loss in employment and GDP. A brief summary of the trade dispute and the WTO steel Panel's findings is then provided. The final section draws some conclusions.
The Determinants of the 2002 US Emergency Safeguard Measures on Steel
The US justification for the Emergency Safeguard Measures on steel was set out by both President Bush and USTR Robert Zoellick. Their arguments for the unilateral tariff were framed in terms of Article XIX.1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. They cited the damage being done to the US steel industry by a surge in imports of 16 categories of steel product (listed in Table 1 ) from the EU, China and Japan, among others, and stressed the temporary nature of the measures. Official statements also emphasised the extensive use of unfair trading practices by steel exporters to the United States and that the Safeguards were 'launched to restore market forces to world steel markets' (Bush 2002) . USTR Zoellick referred to the heavy use of subsidies by the EU ($50 billion since the 1970s) and China ($6 billion in 2001), the high import penetration of the EU and Japan in the US market 'even though they are no more productive' and the use of similar measures by the EU against steel imports from Russia and Ukraine (Zoellick, 2002b) .
It is interesting to consider the principal factors determining the imposition of the US steel Safeguards more closely. These are: the international competitive position of the US steel industry; the impact of the economic downturn in the United States at the end of the 1990s; the influential role of the domestic steel industry lobby; and the need for political expediency. These factors are analysed in turn and then discussed in the context of the WTO rules on the use of Emergency Safeguard
Measures.
The Declining International Competitive Position of the US Steel Industry
The international competitiveness of the US steel industry has been declining since the 1970s. The primary domestic cause has been a lack of investment in new technologies, inflexible labour contracts and increasing legacy (health and pension) costs. There has also been a substantial expansion of lowcost steel production in many industrialising countries, notably China and Korea, giving rise to global over-capacity and increasing import penetration. The 2002 Emergency Safeguards were the most significant of a series of restrictive trade measures on US steel imports in recent years.
The Domestic Problems of the US Steel Industry
The US steel industry is almost dualistic sectoral in structure with large-scale integrated mills producing basic steel and bulk steel products alongside smaller mini-mills producing batch niche steel products. The mini-mills tend to be profitable specialised enterprises utilising advanced technology to produce high value added output. Many large integrated mills however, are loss-making producers of standard steel products reliant upon old technologies.
Many of the firms in the US integrated mill sector have yet to complete the fundamental restructuring of the sector begun in the 1980s, requiring investment in new cost-reducing technologies, the closure of capacity and consolidation. This meant that their high costs stifled their profitability and constrained new investment, even during the boom years of the mid-to late 1990s.
Basic steel production is a large-scale capital-intensive activity but many US integrated mills are below the critical size necessary to be internationally competitive. Two-thirds of US output is Much of the growth in US output however, came from the mini-mills in the form of higher value added steel products; they were responsible for almost 50 per cent of US steel output in 1998, up from 15 per cent in 1981. The growth of the mini-mill sector is reflected in the average productivity data, which rose from ten man hours per ton to four and, in some mini-mills, just two (Lindsey et al., 2001) . Import penetration was greatest in basic steel products that competed with output from the integrated mills. These developments occurred in the face of anti-dumping and countervailing duties being imposed on US steel imports from several sources, including the EU (see below).
Over-Capacity in the Global Steel Industry
The United States has been at the forefront of international efforts to reduce and rationalise the global 
Protective Measures Against Steel Imports by the United States Since 1990
From a US viewpoint, over-capacity in the global steel industry is primarily the result of state intervention in many other countries, creating trade distortions through unfair trading practices such as subsidies, and fuelled by the desire of countries for 'commanding heights' industries (Zoellick, 2002b) . The increasing penetration of the US market by low-cost steel imports has provided the necessary justification for trade intervention. The 2002 steel Safeguards therefore need to be considered in the context of the recent US track record of trade protection in steel.
The United States has a long-standing history of protectionism against steel imports. US imports of steel were, from 1984 to 1992, subject to Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRAs) negotiated with the major steel exporting countries by the first Reagan Administration. Both Clinton Administrations responded aggressively to any positive finding of injury by the USITC while adhering to WTO disciplines (see Brainard, 2001 ) such that the VRAs were therefore allowed to lapse in March 1992.
There followed a wave of more than one hundred Section 201 complaints to the USITC by the steel industry calling for anti-dumping and countervailing duties on low cost imports (Lindsey et al., 1999) .
Most of the USITC investigations however, found little evidence of 'substantial injury'.
A second surge of USITC steel complaints in mid-1998 resulted from the global downturn caused by the 1997 Asian Crisis, the subsequent diversion of exports to the US market and a twomonth strike at General Motors. Although US output in 1998 was down on the record high of 1997, it was still the second best year on record (see Griswold, 1999; Lindsey et al., 2001 ). The US steel industry lobbied extensively for the introduction of retroactive anti-dumping duties, a three-month universal quota on steel imports from selected countries and the revision of Section 201 to eliminate the need for a finding of 'substantial' injury. Anti-dumping and countervailing duties were nevertheless imposed on steel imports from the EU, Japan, Korea, India and Russia, among others.
The magnitude of these duties varied greatly, both between countries and targeted firms, but some were very large. 2 The steel imports targeted by the most substantial of these measures fell sharply as a consequence. Many of the anti-dumping and countervailing actions were referred to the WTO and subsequently found to be illegal. The steel quota proposal was vetoed by President Clinton in spite of a majority vote in the House of Representatives (289 to 141) and Section 201 remained unchanged.
The record therefore suggests that successive US Administrations have had a predisposition to 'supply' protection to the steel industry to reduce import competition. 
The Impact of the 2000 Economic Downturn on the US Steel industry
The economic boom of the 1990s provided some respite for the US steel industry, in spite of the increasing penetration of low-cost imports. The vulnerability of the least competitive parts of the industry, primarily the integrated mills however, was aggravated by the economic downturn in 2000.
This downturn was of a much greater intensity than that in 1998 and necessitated urgent intervention if the restructuring and/or closure of the poorest performing firms were to be deferred. This adverse impact arose in spite of the array of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on steel imports from the EU, Japan, Korea and Russia that had been put in place by the Clinton Administration in 1998. 
The Influence of the US Steel Industry Lobby
The US steel lobby comprises the industry association, The American Iron & Steel Institute, labour unions, notably the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), and congressional representatives from the major steel-producing states. This lobby has been highly successful in securing support from successive US Administrations for protection against imports during domestic downturns, although it is evident that President Clinton was less receptive to these demands than his immediate predecessors.
In spite of the steel industry's declining domestic economic importance, its spatial concentration in the northeastern rust-belt means that the national political leverage of the steel constituencies in these states remains strong.
The onset of the economic downturn in 2000 intensified the efforts of the steel lobby to stave off further lay-offs and firm closures in the industry, exacerbated by the appreciation of the dollar, in spite of falling imports. President George W. Bush was viewed as being more receptive to protectionist sentiments than was the Clinton Administration such that the protection originally sought in 1998 could now be introduced. The consensus among the steel lobby was that enhanced protection would provide sufficient leeway for the less competitive firms without affecting the general recovery of the US economy. The American Iron & Steel Institute also claimed that the impact on consumer prices would be minimal and there would be no meaningful employment effects on steel-consuming industries (BBC, 2002) . USTR Robert Zoellick however, admitted that the Safeguards would raise domestic steel prices by between six and eight per cent (Zoellick, 2002a) .
The Need for Political Expediency
During 3 The author is grateful to the anonymous referee for this insight.
Exceptions to the US Emergency Safeguard Measures on Steel
The Emergency Safeguard Measures were not applied to imports from those countries with which the US had free trade agreements, i.e. the members of NAFTA (Canada and Mexico) together with Israel and Jordan (USITC, 2002) . Tariff exclusions were also made for Australia and South Korea, along with 'generous' tariff quotas for Brazil and Russia, based on import levels in 2000. The principal countries affected were therefore China, the EU and Japan.
The USITC and the US Department of Commerce announced that they were willing to consider objections to the Safeguard Measures submitted by US steel consumers as well as foreign suppliers The broad-brush targeting of the US steel Safeguards had several effects. Protection applied to steel products that were not causing injury and/or were unavailable domestically. Domestic users of such products therefore experienced temporary shortages and large short-term price hikes, sometimes leading to lay-offs and job losses. The exclusion process required firms, many of which were relatively small, to divert scarce resources to lobbying. There were also suggestions of bias; half of the exclusions (by volume) applied to unfinished steel imports (Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003a) . The USWA alleged that some steel firms increased their profits at the expense of US jobs by sourcing steel offshore and processing it domestically. The extensive exclusion process also damaged the credibility of both the USITC and the Safeguards at the WTO and in the broader domestic public sphere.
The WTO and the US Emergency Steel Safeguard Measures
The GATT 1947 rules governing safeguards were dealt with under Articles XII and XIX. 
The Domestic Benefits & Costs of the US Emergency Steel Safeguard Measures
Domestic support in the United States for the 2002 Emergency Safeguard Measures on steel was by no means unanimous. Many steel-consuming firms opposed the tariffs, primarily because of their knock-on effects on production costs at a time of sluggish economic growth. The US consumer lobby group Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC) contended that the new tariffs would cost far more jobs in steel-using industries than they would save in the steel industry itself.
The Direct Impact of the Emergency Safeguard Measures on US Steel Producers
An initial ex ante study undertaken for CITAC, using the original USITC recommendations ( Table 1 ), estimated that an anticipated 9.2 per cent rise in steel prices would save some 8,900 steel jobs at a cost of $450,000 each (Francois and Baughman, 2001) . A second study estimated that steel tariffs of 15 to 20 per cent would cost $2 billion and save 3,500 jobs -at a cost of $584,000 each (Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2002) . 
The Indirect Impact of the Emergency Safeguard Measures on US Steel Consumers
The ex ante study by Francois and Baughman estimated that some 74,500 jobs would be lost, Institute hotly disputed these findings and claimed that jobs were created in both upstream and downstream industries (Morici, 2003) .
The USITC also analysed the impact of the Safeguard Measures on US steel-consuming industries (USITC, 2003b) . Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and 1997
benchmark US input-output data, the study found that the aggregate welfare impact ranged between plus $65.6 million and minus $111.0 million, with a central estimate of minus $41.6 million. The impact on GDP was a fall in the returns to capital of $294.3 million and $386 million to labour offset by increased tariff revenue of $649.9 million (USITC, 2003b). Actual tariff receipts were $294 million, such that the USITC study greatly underestimated the adverse effects on domestic prices and imports (Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003b) . The USITC estimate of the aggregate impact on GDP of minus $30.4 million was almost negligible but its redistributive effects were more substantial. US Government revenue benefited significantly at the expense of falling private sector profits and wage payments, including increased unemployment.
US steel prices rose steeply in the first half of 2002, notably hot-rolled sheet by 81.8 per cent and cold-rolled sheet by 69.4 per cent. The price rises over the whole of 2002 however, were much lower -27 per cent and 19 per cent respectively (Francois and Baughman, 2003) . The domestic steelconsuming industries most adversely affected were motor vehicle parts and some steel fabricating activities (USITC, 2003b). The price squeeze in the car and defence equipment industries was curbed by their monopsony power and use of long-term supply contracts. Many US steel-consuming industries however, are highly atomistic -some 98 per cent of the 193,000 steel-using firms have less than 500 employees (US Small Business Administration, 2000). As price-takers, the steel price rises had a severe impact on their costs, profit margins and employment, shifting demand towards imported manufactures, although these effects were partly mitigated by the higher cost of imported steel.
The tightening of the US steel market had several additional effects as steel-consuming firms attempted to reduce their costs. There was a suspected increase in trade deflection to avoid the higher steel duties, whereby affected products were imported via third countries, particularly Canada and Mexico. The American Iron & Steel Institute also expressed concern about: 'substantial transformation' in third countries for customs reclassification; in-bond shipments re-crossing NAFTA borders to obscure their origin; and simple circumvention though the false classification of products (American Iron & Steel Institute, 2002) .
unfunded pension liabilities from nine steel firms.
The WTO Steel Case
The 
The Threat of Retaliatory Action Against the United States
The EU and several other targeted countries had already threatened retaliatory action against the Carolina pyjamas along with a large number of steel products (Crutsinger, 2003) . The President was therefore faced with a 'negative sum' domestic policy game that required an irreconcilable choice to be made between two different sets of marginal states.
On 4 December 2003, USTR Robert Zoellick announced that the US steel Safeguards were to be lifted on the grounds that they had been successful, that the domestic economic situation had improved and that their cost now outweighed their benefit (Zoellick, 2003 
Conclusions
The In recent decades, the United States has exhibited a predisposition towards trade intervention in steel. During the second Clinton Administration, this was tempered by the proviso that such intervention was WTO-compatible. The Bush Administration has had no such proviso but its greater protectionist sentiments, partly in the interest of short-term domestic political expediency, have nevertheless ultimately been subject to the same compatibility criterion.
The conduct of the USITC Section 201 investigation also raises the issue of possible domestic political pressure to find evidence of injury. The WTO steel Panel criticised the USITC for its blanket recommendations made on the basis of 'broad brush' product categories rather than a product-byproduct methodology. The lack of focus in the USITC investigation suggests excessive haste and political expediency to assuage the demands of the influential US steel constituency, particularly in the light of the extensive subsequent process of product exclusions from the Safeguards. This lends further support to the view that the primary motivation of the US Emergency Safeguard Measures for steel was to appease domestic protectionist sentiments.
As expected, the Safeguards had direct beneficial impacts on prices, employment and profits in the steel industry. The negative effective protection effects on downstream industrial activities were also substantial however, because of steel's importance as an intermediate input and led to price and profit squeezes, lay-offs, redundancies and firm closures. Empirical studies indicate that the aggregate impact of the Safeguards on US GDP and employment was negative. Further, this was accompanied by a sizeable redistribution of welfare from the private sector in terms of lost revenues, jobs and profits towards the US Government as increased tariff revenue. The Safeguards may almost certainly, although perhaps inadvertently, have increased the cost of the Iraq War to the US taxpayer.
The settlement of the WTO steel dispute in 21 months demonstrates the speed and effectiveness of the new DSU with respect to the previous GATT system. The relatively rapid resolution of the dispute is important in both the specific and broader contexts. The world's two leading traders were pitched against each other in an acrimonious dispute that could possibly have threatened the very existence of the multilateral trade system. It can be argued however, that the DSU has emerged stronger and more credible as a result because the United States opted to back down and accept the primacy of the WTO as the multilateral arbiter of the rules on trade. 
